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1 This is a widely revised version of a study that has had a long gestation period. Some of the early 
revisions have been written while visiting  the Institute for Industrial and Labor Relations, Princeton 
University in the spring of 2000, where Contini was given generous hospitality. We have benefited 
from comments received after presentations of this version at Princeton, Torino, Padova and Aarhus. 
In particular, we wish to thank O. Ashenfelter and H. Farber. This research has been carried out 
thanks to grants by  MUIR (1999 and 2001) to a inter-university research project “Labor mobility and 
wages: measurement problems, analytical tools, policy evaluation”, coordinated by U. Trivellato of 
the University of Padua. Very valuable research assistantship has been provided by Roberto Quaranta. 
  1 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study aims at establishing how mobility  affected individual wages in the five-
year period 1986-91, characterized by a slow worsening of Italy's economic position, 
leading into the 1990-91 recession. In those years many firms went through heavy 
restructuring, and downsizing was a frequent event. 
 
We investigate the relation between wage levels, wage growth and labour mobility 
on Italian dependent workers, whose careers are observable between 1986 and 1991.  
Our principal aim is to ascertain whether  job changes have improved the position of 
movers vis-à-vis the stayers’ over a five-year long observation window, and to what 
extent did job displacement inflict wage losses to downsized workers. 
 
We use an employer-employee linked database developed from Italian Social 
Security (INPS) administrative sources, from which we build a closed panel of full-
time male employees of all industries of the private sector, at work both in 1986 and 
1991. Exclusions relate to women, in order to have better control over individual 
characteristics, and to the construction sector, in view of its seasonal characteristics 
which interfere in the study of mobility. 
 
The choice of working with a closed panel rather than an open panel of dependent 
workers is dictated by the opportunity of finessing very substantial problems of 
unobserved heterogeneity: as will be explained in par.AB, attrition is considerable 
and all but a random event. Furthermore, our objective being an investigation on the 
comparative advantage of movers vs. stayers, not on impact –as is done in many 
studies on job switching
2 - but over a relatively long observation window,  the 
relevant “movers” are those who are succeed in moving from one job to another, 
eventually going through unemployment spells, much less those who become long 
term unemployed or leave the labour market altogether. 
 
For this reason we choose to work – for the time being - with only one observation 
per individual, while retaining, it goes without saying,  the relevant information on 
the events occurred within the 1986-1991 observation window.  Full open panel 
modelling and estimation will be taken up in the next future.   
 
We move from a stylized fact about working conditions, tenure and pay at various 
firm-types. Ranking firms by size, the following stylized facts emerge clearly: 
(i)  large firms pay better wages than small ones;  
(ii)  mean tenure at large firms is higher than at small enterprises; 
 
  Gross yearly earnings 1995  
(million Lit.) 
Mean duration of employment 
spells (years) 
Firm size  white collars  blue collars  All 
< 20  29.6  25.6  2.0 
20-200 38.9  27.7  3.4 
200-500 44.6  29.6  5.3 
> 500  50.4  31.7  7.7 
Source: B. Contini, C. Malpede, L. Pacelli, F. Rapiti (1996) 
 
The former indication is in line with predictions from efficiency wage theory; the 
latter with two well known facts: (1) small firms are often short lived compared to 
                                                 
2 See M. Burda and A.Mertens (2001), S. Nickell et al. (2002), H.S. Farber (1993). 
  2 the large ones; (2) job hierarchies are longer and more articulated in large businesses, 
where mobility often takes place along internal lines
3. 
 
Given these premises, the following are the questions we intend to answer: 
1  Are there sizeable differentials between stayers and movers ? 
2  Does firm size affect wage growth for movers (across firms of different size) as 
much as it determines cross-sectional wage level differentials 
3  Does age matter, i.e. is the impact of job changes and firm size on wage growth 
the same between young and old workers  
4  Are there significant differences between what we identify as voluntary and 
involuntary job changes? 
4  
5  Are frequent movers better off  than one-time movers ? 
6  Do unemployment spells negatively affect wage growth ? 
7  Are there sizeable downsizing effects on wage growth ?  
 
 
A quick look at the literature 
 
A rich body of empirical studies on various aspects of mobility and wage dynamics 
has grown in the Nineties, as databases containing information on workers, jobs and 
firms have become available. 
Hartog and Van Ophem (1994) study wage growth of certain groups of employees 
discriminating between mobile and non-mobile employees, and between voluntary 
and non-voluntary job changes; C. Flinn (1986) analyses the intertemporal structure 
of wages for young workers separately for movers and stayers. He presents evidence 
that unobserved worker-firm heterogeneity is an important component in the wage 
growth of young workers.  H. Farber (1993 and 1997) looks into the cost of job 
losses after displacement, finding that job losses adversely affects workers' earnings 
in many ways. Employment probabilities are reduced and an increased probability of 
working part-time yields lower earnings both through shorter hours and lower wage 
rates. The decline in real weekly earnings between the pre displacement job and the 
post displacement job averages about 13% for all reemployed displaced workers and 
about 9% for workers displaced from full-time job who are reemployed on full time 
job. Burda and Mertens (2001) find that wages of displaced workers in Germany 
decline slightly upon reemployment. The lowest wage quartile (where displacement 
is concentrated) gains slightly, while losses for the upper three quartiles are 
comparable to the US evidence. Evidence on real wage losses consequent on 
unemployment is provided for the UK by S. Nickell et al. (2002): estimated hourly 
losses amount to 10-20% during the first year from rehiring after the first 
unemployment spell. Longer duration spells are associated to significantly greater 
losses. A somewhat different question is posed by P. Gautier et al. (2002): who gets 
crowded out during downturns in the Netherlands ? Their findings are that at each 
job level it is mainly the lower educated workers who leave during downturns.  
                                                 
3 Cfr. B. Contini and R. Revelli (1997) 
4 As will be explained, we proxy voluntary and involuntary movements by the employment pattern of 
the firms where job changes originate, as we have no direct elements  to identify quits or layoffs. 
Where a large decline in firm size takes place in the observation period,  or where a close-out takes 
place, we presume that worker separations pre-empt a likely layoff in the near future, and therefore 
take them as involuntary movements. 
 
  3 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON STAYERS AND MOVERS 
2.1.  How many stayers and movers ? 
 
Our analysis is based on individual data from the Administrative Social Security 
(INPS) archives. We use a panel of workers matched to their firm of affiliation of 
approximately 100,000 workers each year from 1985 to 1991. From this panel we 
select a sample of 30167 full time workers, employed both in 1986 and in 1991 in the 
manufacturing and service sectors, and aged 20-50 in 1986. We find two groups:  
 
(i)  20526 stayers (68%), employed at the same firm at the beginning and at the 
end of the observation period  (not necessarily  uninterrupted spells) 
(ii)  9641 movers (32%), who make one or more job-changes during the 1986-91 




 Tab. 1 Stayers and movers by individual and firm characteristics  
 (percentages) 
   Movers Stayers 
ALL  32.0 68.0 
Stayers and movers by age and skill level    
Age 20-30  Blue  45.3  54.7 
 White  38.4  61.6 
Age 30-40  Blue  28.5  71.5 
 White  26.3  73.7 
Age 40-50  Blue  24.7  75.3 
 White  22.7  77.3 
Stayers and movers by industry    
 Energy, gas, water  12.6  87.5 
 Iron and steel, mining  32.6  67.4 
 Metalworking and mechanical industries  35.0  65.0 
 Food, textiles, paper  38.4  61.6 
 Wholesale and retail trade  41.1  58.9 
 Transport and communication  16.4  83.6 
 Finance  15.6  84.4 
Stayers and movers by firm size    
 0-20  44.3  55.7 
 20-200  32.6  67.4 
 >200  20.6  79.4 
 
Moves are more frequent among young workers, and decrease with ageing of the 
working force. Moves are also more frequent among blue-collars than white-collars. 
Almost half of the employed blue-collars aged 20-30 experience at least one job 
change in the 1986-91 period. This is not unexpected: in those years young people 
were eligible to be hired under 2-year "training-and-work" contracts (CFL), not 
                                                 
5 Mobility in this panel is not  comparable to the separation and association rates estimated for the 
Italian economy at large (Contini et al., 1996): our current database consists of a closed panel of 
individuals employed as dependent workers both in 1986 and in 1991, as opposed to open panels 
which include all exits from and entry to employment. The mean annual separation rates observed 
from open panels from the same administrative source are in the order of  34% of dependent 
employment in the private sector. Not surprisingly, the overall separation rate is many times higher 
than the frequency of job changes observed in this closed panel. 
  4 subject to renewal. At the end of the contract period, either the contract was changed 
into a regular one, or a job-change was necessary. 
 
A breakdown by industry indicates that movers are concentrated in the trade sector, 
and in food, textiles, and other traditional manufacturing.  Few movers are found in 
the public utilities (energy, gas and water ). 
 
Not surprisingly, the frequency of job-to-job switches is inversely proportional to 
firm-size: 44% of workers employed at small firms in 1986 change jobs in the 
observation period; this frequency falls to 33% for workers employed at mid-size 
firms, and to 21% for workers of large firms. This is a reflection of the 
physiologically high turnover of small-size businesses, coupled with the fact that: (i) 
high turnover is often perceived as a threat to employment stability; (ii) many 
employees of small firms may therefore wish to move to larger establishments, 
inspite of the fact that working conditions may be less pleasant than in the firm of 
origin; (iii) pay increases with firm size. Last but not least, as often reported in the 
literature on Italy’s industrial districts
6, small firms play an important role of 
training-on-the-job of young workers, and therefore job changes in the direction of 
larger firms is the epilogue of this process. 
 
2.2  Recognizing the downsized workers 
 
We deal with the issue by looking at the five-year trend of employment in the firms 
from which the job-changes originate, and classify them in five groups as follows: 
1.  Expansion, if between 1986 and 1991 the firm has increased its workforce; 
2.  Constant if no significant variation has happened in the firm employment; 
3.  Decline if in the 86-91 period the firm has reduced employment from 10 to 
40%; 
4.  Strong decline if the decline is by more than 40% of the workforce on payroll; 
5.  Closeout if the firms has closed in the period.  
  
For lack of more precise information, we classify as “downsized workers” all those 
who leave a firm that has either closed down, or experienced a drastic employment 
cut in 1986-91. There are good reasons to suppose that job changes following such 
separations are, as it were, forced by the events. Workers who fear the risk of being 
downsized in the near future, will, whenever possible, engage in early job-shopping 
in order to pre-empt a likely layoff. We expect these workers to take wage losses 
compared to other job changers.  
 
  Table 2 Movers and stayers by firm of origin  
 Expanding  Constant  Declining  Strong 
decline 
Closing Total 
Movers  24.7  9.6 13.1 15.9 36.7  100 
Stayers 52.9  23.5  20.2  3.3  0  100 
 
Over 50% of the observed movers are “downsized” according to our definition, i.e. 
they originate from firms that have drastically reduced their workforce or that have 
closed down altogether. On the other hand almost one fourth of the movers have left 
expanding firms. Not surprisingly, three fourth of the stayers belong to firms that 
have either expanded workforce or showed no sizeable change. 
                                                 
6 For all, see  
  5  
  Table 3 Downsized workers by age 
  Age  20 –30  Age  30 – 40  Age 40 – 50  Sample size 
Movers  39.0 34.1 26.9  4751 
Stayers  28.1 33.7 38.2  683 
 
A slight majority of the downsized workers is in young age, while the stayers, i.e. 
those who get retained inspite of the employment  cuts, are somewhat older. 
 
Table 4 Downsized workers by skill group and percentiles in the relative wage 
ratios  in 1986 and 1991  
  Sample 
size 
Mean   P25  P50 =median  P75 
1986         
Blue collars         
Downsized 3904  0.965  0.836  0.944  1.063 
All 20415  1.000  0.856  0.973  1.118 
1991          
Downsized 3904  0.957  0.797  0.920  1.063 
All 20415  1.000  0.829  0.956  1.129 
         
1986         
White-collars         
Downsized 1530  0.962  0.760  0.900  1.099 
All 9752  1.000  0.805  0.958  1.137 
1991         
Downsized 1530  0.963  0.711  0.882  1.133 
All 9752  1.000  0.761  0.932  1.156 
 
We measure the relative pay level by the ratio (INEQ)  between the individual wage 
at (t) - w(i,t) - and the average wage at (t) of individuals belonging to the same cell: 
age x industry, separately for blue and white collars. For both skill groups the 
relative pay level of the displaced workers  is lower than that of the overall sample, 
after appropriately weighing in order to account for age differences. At all percentiles 
of the INEQ86 and INEQ91 ratios there is a sizeable difference against the workers 
who loose their post as a consequence of downsizing. The ex-ante differential (1986) 
is in line with the findings of P. Gautier et al. (2002) in Holland, and of Burda and 
Mertens (2001) in Germany.  
 
 
  2.3  Characteristics of job changes 
 
Most of the job changes take place within sectors: only few workers (less than 5%) 
move from manufacturing to service industries, slightly more in the opposite 
direction. 
 
Tab. 5 Frequency of job changes 1986-91 across different sector 
(percentages) 
  1991   
1986  Manufacturing Services  Total 
Manufacturing 95.4  4.6  100.0 
Services 7.9  92.1  100.0 
  6  
Likewise, many job changes are observed across firms of equivalent size.  Moves 
towards larger firms are more frequent than moves in the reverse direction. The 
pattern is clearly visible in manufacturing, less so in the service industries. 
 
Tab. 6 Frequency of job changes 1986-91 across firms of different size 
(percentages) 
Manufacturing 
 Small  medium  large 
small   ( < 20)  56.2  33.7  10.1 
medium  (20- 500)  20.8  59.0  20.2 
large  (>  500 )  3.0  22.8  74.2 
Services 
 Small  medium  large 
small  ( < 20)  69.2  23.8  7.1 
medium  (20- 500)  22.7  45.0  32.3 
large  ( > 500 )  5.1  37.6  57.3 
 
Only 14% of movers move to firms located in a different province, and less than 5% 
change also macro regions (North-West, North-East, Centre, South, Islands).  
 
Tab. 7 Frequency of movers that undertake geographical mobility 
  N° in our panel  % of movers 
Movers who change province 
between 1986-1991 
1363 14.1 






2.4  Promotions and contract transformations 
 
We deal here with promotions that involve a status change (i.e. from manual to 
white-collar and from white-collar to manager), and contract transformations of two-
year training-and-work subsidized youth contracts (CFL = contratti di formazione e 
lavoro), changed into permanent  positions). 
 
Our data provide information on contract changes: less than 6% of the workers 
included in the sample are involved in such changes between 1986 and 1991.  
 
Tab. 8 Promotions between 1986 and 1991 
 To  WHITE-
COLLAR 
To MANAGER   
From MANUAL  1338  106  1444 
From WHITE-
COLLAR 
- 221  221 
 1338  327  1665 
 
Promotions involving only skill upgrading across pay levels (“livelli di 
inquadramento”) without any contract change may be detected only through the ex-
post observation of unusually high pay raises. Most industry contracts stipulate eight 
pay grades for the manual worker class, with modest wage improvements in 
between, and up to ten for the white-collar’s, with pay raises that are modest at the 
initial steps and become much more sizeable moving up the ladder. The impact of 
skill upgrading will be discussed in par.      
  7  
Contract changes are relatively more frequent at young age for blue-collars who 
leave a manual job for a white-collar position. Later in life contract changes denote 
promotions, often on-the-job, from blue-collar to white-collar status. White-collars 
occasionally get promoted to a manager position (never at young age, more often in 
concomitance with a job-change).  
 
Tab. 9 Frequency of occupational upgrading 
  Age 20-30  Age 30-40  Age 40-50 
  Blue White  Blue White  Blue White 
Movers  12.97 1.12 7.82 5.48 6.60  4.75 
Stayers  7.12 0.52 5.79 1.99 3.83  2.23 
 
Almost all of the CFL - subsidized contracts for youth in existence in 1986 have been 
transformed by 1991: about half  by the firm of origin and half by a new firm. The 
contract could be stipulated for 1 or 2 years, and was subject to only one renewal 
with the same firm. The clause did not apply, however, if the worker changed 
employer  (only 35 cases in our sample).   
 
Tab. 10 Training-and-work contracts (CFL) for young workers  
 
In existence in 1986  688 
Transformed into 
permanent positions by 




permanent positions by 
1991 after a job change 
(movers) 
355 
Still CFL by 1991  35 
 
2.5 Unemployment  spells 
 
Unemployment spells are recorded and show important differences between stayers 
and movers: the vast majority of the stayers never experiences unemployment (spell 
= 0); those who do (less than 5% of the total) are workers who get rehired by the firm 
of origin after a long spell out of work, sometimes longer than 3 years. For over 50% 
of the movers a 0-spell is recorded, meaning that these workers make a direct job-to-
job switch. About 10% experience unemployment spells lasting less than 1 year; the 
same percentage is out of work for 12-24 months and 24-36 months. Over 15% of 
the movers find a job after spending more than 3 years in unemployment. Not 
unexpectedly, long duration unemployment scars future pay: this will be discussed in 
par.    . 
 
Tab. 11 Unemployment duration of movers and stayers 
               M o v e r s                                     S t a y e r s     
Spell duration 
(months)  Frequency % Frequency % 
0 4986  51.71  19552  95.25 
1-3   49  0.51  0  0 
4-6 370  3.84  19  0.09 
7-12 632  6.56  56  0.27 
  8 12-24 1103  11.44  324 1.58 
24-36 979  10.15 337  1.64 
> 36  1522  15.79  238  1.16 
All 9641  100.00  20526  100.00 
 
2.6  Wage levels and growth rates among movers and stayers 
 
An important question relates to the causes of job-change: is it voluntary or is it 
forced by the events? Is it the final outcome of a process of job-search in which both 
workers and firms become involved, or is it – as it were - “imposed” on the workers 
by outside forces? The latter is not at all an unlikely event: in the course of many 
recent episodes of industrial restructuring, large employment reductions are 
negotiated between management and unions. The outcome of the bargaining table is 
often an agreement to help the re-deployment of a consistent fraction of the work-
force to other firms, only at times belonging to the same financial group. In such a 
case, the most able workers may refuse re-deployment and do the job-shopping on 
their own, but many will take whatever is offered to them. 
We do not, unfortunately, have this type of information in our data. Nor do we know 
when job-changes are associated with voluntary quits or when they are consequent to 
firings.
7  The latter may be “collective” if they originate from medium-large firms in 
the process of restructuring. 
On the other hand, a job-changer who leaves a rapidly growing firm is more likely to 
be a voluntary job-seeker: a comparatively high 1991-pay would confirm this hunch.  
Both predictions appear to be borne out in the following Table 7. 
 
Tables 12 contains means and standard deviations of monthly wages of movers and 
stayers in 1986 and 1991.  Average wage growth 1986-91 is 60%. Italy’s consumer 
price index increased by 32 p.p. between 1986 and 1991. Thus real wage growth in 
our sample is almost 30% in the 5-year observation period. 
  
Table 12 Monthly wages in 1986 and 1991 and wage growth rate 86-91 for 
movers and stayers by different firm trends 
    Movers Stayers 





  Wage  86  9641 1731.2  548.2  20526 1906.7  604.2  +10.1 
  Wage  91  9641 2805.2  1138.3  20526 3042.3  1184.5  +8.4 
  Wage growth rate  9641  1.6  0.4  20526  1.6  0.3 
By trend in the 
firm of origin  
          
 
Expansion Wage  86  2227  1753.8 576.8  10858  1941.2 618.8  +10.7 
  Wage  91  2227 2937.7  1261.3  10858 3146.7  1218.5  +7.1 
 Wage growth rate  2227  1.68  0.42  10858  1.62  0.29   
Constant Wage  86  870  1689.6 502.0  4831  1902.7 611.1  +12.6 
  Wage  91  870 2799.2  1131.6  4831 3010.5  1202.3  +7.5 
                                                 
7  The distinction between quits and layoffs is always very difficult.  Neat in principle, often useless in 
practice: individual firings are seldom revealed even in the course of in-depth interviews, as they are 
perceived to carry a stigma.  Only collective layoffs are easily recognizable, as they may be followed 
by public  measures aimed at easing the transition.  Unfortunately, this is seldom acknowledged in 
much of the literature, and the consequent error-in-variables bias neglected.  
 
  9  Wage growth rate  870  1.66  0.42  4831  1.57  0.28   
Decline  Wage  86  1183 1713.4  521.0  4142 1837.2  533.1  +10.7 
+2.4    Wage  91  1183 2780.6  1107.8  4142 2846.8  1022.3 
 
 Wage growth rate  1183  1.64  0.41  4142  1.55  0.28  
Strong decline  Wage 86  1439  1739.1  582.7  681  1811.4  675.7  +4.1 
  Wage  91  1439 2768.1  1061.2  681 2802.5  1227.9  +1.2 
 Wage growth rate  1439  1.61  0.36  681  1.55  0.33 
Closeout Wage  86  3312  1742.5  541.4       
 Wage 91  3312  2775.1  1121.8       
 
 Wage growth rate  3312  1.60  0.37         
 
Several patterns are clearly shown: 
(i)  the mean initial wage (1986) of the stayers is more than 10 p.p. higher than 
that of the movers (before moving) in all groups; the mean final wage (1991) 
of the stayers is 8.4 p.p. higher than the movers’; 
(ii)  the mean 1991 wage of the stayers is between 7 – 7.5 p.p. higher than that of 
the movers in the group of expanding or constant-employment firms. It is 
marginally higher (between 1.2 and 2.4 p.p.) among the declining firms; 
(iii)  the wage growth of the movers is slightly higher than the stayers' in all 
groups of firms;  
(iv)  the standard deviation of the movers' growth rate is somewhat higher than the 
stayers' (0.4 vs. 0.3); 
(v)  for both movers and stayers employed at expanding firms the mean wage 
1986 and 1991 is notably higher than in all other groups of firms. 
 
Descriptive statistics confirm shared knowledge: workers with lower initial wages 
find encouragement in job searching and subsequent change (the initial wage of 
those who will move is lower than that of those who will stay); the wage growth of 
movers is higher than that of the stayers (especially at young age and for white-
collars: see table 8), but variability is also higher. On average, however, the mean 
wage of the stayers at the end of the observation period, is still substantially above 
that of the movers. In addition, table 8 suggests that the movers’ wage growth is 
higher than the stayers’ among the white collars, the differential decreasing with age. 
For the blue collars instead, characterized by flatter earning profiles, this occurs only 
among young workers (aged 20-30) 
 
Table 13 Wage growth by occupational status and  
                                        age  
AGE OCCUPATION  STAYER  MOVERS 
20-30 BLUE  1.56  1.6 
 WHITE  1.77  1.9 
30-40 BLUE  1.53  1.52 
 WHITE  1.71  1.78 
40-50 BLUE  1.51  1.51 
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3 MODEL  SPECIFICATION 
 
3.1  Open vs, closed panel estimation 
 
A thorough exploration of the database reveals that attrition is considerable and all 
but a random event: about one third of the workers present in 1986 drop out of the 
panel by 1991, and, while there is evidence (external from our database) that the vast 
majority of male dropouts end up in states with negative economic connotation 
(unemployment, shadow economy, rarely out of the labour force unless young), few 
will undoubtedly experience upwards mobility by moving, for instance, into 
successful self-employment
8. Such transitions, for which no information is available 
in the panel, would introduce a vast amount of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
analysis, should we decide to opt for open panel econometrics. 
9  Furthermore the 
principal aim of the paper is to ascertain whether movers are better off than stayers 
over a relatively long observation period, and not on impact, as is done in many 
studies on job switching. The relevant “movers” for this type of analysis are those 
who switch jobs across firms, eventually going through unemployment spells, much 
less those who become long term unemployed or leave the labour market altogether. 
                                                 
 
8  The frequency of transitions  into self-employment following a separation from dependent work has 
been estimated around  9-10% of all separations. See B. Contini et al. (1996).  
 
9 The problems of heterogeneity arising  in the open panel  may be assessed by the probability of 
attrition (OUT = leaving the panel, and not having re-entered within a given time), conditional to the 
initial position in the earnings distribution.  
 
Table 14 Probability of attrition (Q, OUT) from each quintile of the wage distribution, by age, 
observed in the 1986-1991 window 
Quintile 1986  <25  25-34  35-49  50-64 
Q1  43 55 56 81 
Q2  31 40 39 68 
Q3  24 32 31 62 
Q4  19 24 26 61 
Q5  15 17 19 58 
Cont’d 
  11 3.2 Estimation 
 
Estimation is performed by OLS on two separate equations (one for the blue-collars, 
one for the white-collars), the dependent variable being  w(i;jk), the wage change 
(1986-91) for the i-th individual who has moved from firm-type j (in 1986) to firm-

















jk i W  [I] 
 
 
Table 15 Probability of attrition P(Q, OUT) from Q1 and Q4 by age, observed at windows 
of different length 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Age 15-24       
P(1, OUT)  23.52  39.26  49.74 
P (4,OUT)  22.20  30.47  38.76 
Age 25-34     
P(1, OUT)  33.15  53.20  57.64 
P (4,OUT)  10.45  20.75  24.46 
Age 35-49       
P(1, OUT)  29.68  52.46  63.60 
P (4,OUT)  7.03  19.82  39.31 
Age 50-64       
P(1, OUT)  39.88  76.08  94.57 
P (4,OUT)  20.75  66.62  94.09 
 
 
Table 16 Probability of attrition  P (Q, OUT) from Q1 and Q4 by sex, observed at windows of 
different length  
MALE  1 YEAR  5 YEARS  10 YEARS 
P(1, OUT)  25.09  47.38  60.14 




P(1, OUT)  28.59  44.21  53.75 
P (4,OUT)  10.86  29.27  45.76 
At all ages, the higher the earnings in 1986, the lower the probability of attrition (i.e. leaving 
dependent work some time before 1991). Surprisingly similar results are reported for the U.K. by 
Gosling (1997). The vast majority of movements out of dependent work (with the obvious exception 
of the retirees) appears to have a negative connotation, whether or not the state of destination is 
outright unemployment 
Analogous implications are suggested by the probability of attrition at (t+T) conditional on the length 
of one’s employment spell at (t):  for male workers, less than 45 yrs. of age, it was estimated as 
follows: 
 
Prob [OUT (94) / (job length < 3 months in 1991) ] = 0.50 
Prob [OUT (94) / (job length between 6 and 11 months in 1991) ] = 0.15 
 
The vast majority of those who have exited the panel by 1994 are in bad economic conditions 




  12 w (i;jk) may  be expressed as a linear function of X exogenous regressors and 
residuals: 





Z    X
 Z  +  u 
 
where  the superscripts  I, F, Z denote regressors associated respectively with 
individual characteristics, firm characteristics, and general macro-indicators. 
 
As already explained, the sample includes one observation for each individual in the 
panel. Thus, while there is no room for panel estimation with unobservable, time-
invariant, individual effects, we cannot simply do away with initial conditions that 
could influence the wage growth in the five-year period 1986-91. Our choice for a 
proxy of initial conditions is the i-th individual's relative wage in 1986, i.e. the ratio 
between w(i,86) and the average wage 1986 of all individuals belonging to the same 
cell (age x industry x skill level). To the extent that one’s relative initial wage 
reflects also individual characteristics, this approach ought to yield satisfactory 
results
10. To these results, and to the consequences of possible endogeneity of our 




F reflect individual and firm characteristics. Are our data 
adequate to yield a satisfactory representation of  X
I   and  X
F   ? 
 
(X
I ):  education is not observable. This is a problem, but not a major one safe for 
young workers.
11  We find indirect confirmation of this hunch in par.ZX; 
(X
F  ): our firm data are rich in some respects (industrial 2-digit classification, 
geography, employment and earnings history by skill level and size, firm age, entry 
and exit flags), and weak in others. In particular, we have no data on performance, 






I  regressors (14) 
Activated for movers and stayers 
INEQ86    initial (1986) relative wage  (proxy for initial conditions)    
AGE Age 
UN-MOV  unemployment spell between jobs  (in months), movers 
UN-STA  unemployment spell between jobs  (in months), stayers 
MOV-2   (*)  2 job changes in the observation period 
MOV-3   (*)  3 job changes in the observation period 
MOV-4   (*)  more than 3 job changes in the observation period 
DAV (*)  occupational upgrading, involving a contract change (from blue to white 
collars and from white to manager occupation) 
DZO (*)  geographical mobility 
DZO*DOWN (*)   geographical mobility for downsized workers  
SET01 (*)  intersectoral mobility (from manufacturing to services) 
SET10 (*)   Intersectoral mobility (from services to manufacturing) 
SET01*DOWN (*)  intersectoral mobility (from manufacturing to services) for downsized workers  
SET10*DOWN  (*)  intersectoral mobility (from services to manufacturing) for downsized 
workers  
                                                 
10  Another approach to the problem is that of Stewart, Swaffield (1998). To solve the problem of 
sample selection bias due to correlation across time between the unobservable, they use extra 
variables as instruments for the selection probability into the initial state. 
11 Hartog and Van Ophem (1994) find that education has little or no effect on wage growth in relation 
to mobility. Bonjour and Pacelli (1998) tested on Swiss data the size and the direction of bias when 
age is used as a proxy for education and experience. They find that using age as a proxy for education 
leads to a small bias for men and full time working women.  
  13  
DOWN is a 0-1 dummy activated if the firm of origin has reduced employment by 
more than 40% or has closed in the 86-91 period (firms belonging to groups  4 or 5 
as described in § 2.2) 
 
X
F regressors (49) 
Activated for movers and stayers  (12) : 
R1 -->  R8    (*)  industrial sector 
SMALL - LARGE  (*)  firm size 1986 
NOV-NES-SUD-ISO  (*)  4 geographical dummies (firm location) 
 
Activated only for stayers (1): 
DOWN-STA (*)  Firm has had a strong decline in employment in the 
period (firm in  group 4) 
 
Activated only for movers  (36): 
DM1 --> DM9     (*)  job-change across firm size (manufacturing) 
DS1 --> DS9   (*)  job-change across firm size (services) 
DM1 --> DM9  * DOWN    job-change across firm size (manufacturing) for 
downsized  workers  
DS1 --> DS9   * DOWN  job-change across firm size (services) for downsized 
workers  
 
For each branch 9 dummy variables denote job-changes involving movements across 
firms classified by size (DM1 - DM9 for manufacturing; DS1- DS9 for services). We 
distinguish small firms (< 20 employees), medium firms (20 -200 employees ) and 
large firms ( > 200 employees ). Thus we have 3 x 3= 9 "types" of job-change. The 
associated variables are activated as follows: 
 
  1  i-th individual moves from firm-type j to firm-type k 
  D (i; jk) =  ( j, k = 1,2,3 ) 
 0  otherwise 
 
If the i-th individual is a "stayer" none of the D dummies are activated. In order to 
catch the “downsizing” effect,  all the D variables above are interacted with a dummy 
(DOWN) activated if the firm of origin has either closed down or drastically reduced 
its work-force in the 1986-91 period. 
 
Additional controls are provided by MOV-2 through  MOV-4, which we place 
among the X(I) regressors: frequent job changes may reflect a positive attitude 
towards job search, and have a positive impact on wages. There could be, however, 
decreasing returns beyond a certain amount of job-switching, which our specification 
allows to catch. 
 
Spells of unemployment (UN-MOV; UN-STA) may be observed for movers between 
successive jobs, and for stayers if their tenure is interrupted. The longer the spell, the 
higher the reduction of one's earning potential as a consequence of loss of visibility 
in the job market and/or loss of working ability. 
 
4 THE  RESULTS 
 
We report here only the main results of OLS estimation.  The full set of results are 
  14 available upon request. Estimation is performed separately for each skill-group, the 
dependent variable being individual wage growth over the horizon 1986.91. Age and 
age square are introduced as additional controls and turn out significant, respectively 
negative and very slightly positive, as expected from the hump-shaped profile of 
wage levels vs. age. We have also estimated the model by three age groups, but do 
not report them here as differences are very slight. The only exception relates to the 
coefficients that catch the impact of job change across firms of different size: these 






4.1  Movers vs. stayers: promotions and contract changes 
 
Not unexpectedly,  promotions that involve a contract change (i.e. from manual to 
white-collar and from white-collar to manager), and contract transformations (CFL - 
two-year training-and-work subsidized youth contracts  changed into permanent 
positions) have a sizeable impact on wage growth. 
 
Wage gain 1986-91 (in percentage points)       Stayers  Movers 
 
Contract transformation and promotions (contract change): 
CFL transformed into permanent (manual)          0        0   
CFL transformed into permanent (white-collar)        0                     13  + 
CFL transformed into permanent  
  (with promotion from manual to white-collar)   28        28 + 
  
Permanent job: promotions from manual to white-collar     18                    18  + 
Permanent job: promotions from white-collar to manager      53                    53  + 
 
  (+) plus eventual extra gain associated to change of industry, geographical area  
and firm size (details in par.    ). 
 
 
A CFL – transformation for manual workers does not carry any monetary advantage 
to either stayers or movers, unless it is accompanied by skill upgrading. For white 
collars, instead, a CFL-transformation yields a 13 p.p. gain only when the contract is 
transformed after a rehire by another firm. Promotions involving a contract change 
yield the same gain to stayers and movers: 18 p.p. from manual to white collar, 53 
p.p. from white collar to  manager position. Not unexpectedly, the latter’s reward is 
much higher than the former. The movers’ advantage may be enhanced by extra 







  15 Table 17 Movers: wage gains due to job switches involving 
industry and geographical change 









0.06 *  0.17 ** 









The data reveal an extra advantage for movers who change activity sector, slightly 
higher if the switch is from manufacturing to the service industries compared to the 
opposite switch;  higher for the white-collars than the blue-collar workers. 
Geographical change (across macro-regions: North, Centre, South and Islands) 




4.2  Movers: job switches across firms of different size 
 
Our prior is that job switches across firms of different size may have an important 
impact of their own on wage growth. The relevant information is compressed in the 
following (3 x 3) matrices of OLS estimated coefficients associated to job-switches 
across firms classified into three size classes. The associated dummies are activated 
only for movers,  the stayers being the benchmark: 
S  “small” firms (less than 20 employees)  
M  “medium” firms (20 – 200 employees) 
L  “large” firms ( > 200 employees) 
Cells show a zero when the relative coefficient is non significantly different from 
zero. Each cell shows, in parenthesis, also the impact of the switch net of the 
"downsize effect" associated to workers leaving a firm belonging to group 4 or 5 
(drastic employment reduction or firm closure). When missing, the relative DOWN 
variable is non significantly different from zero. Comments on this are delayed to the 
next paragraph.  
Moving across the columns of each 3x3  table (from left to right) denotes the effect 
of a job switch ending in firms of increasing dimension. Moving across the rows 
(from high to low) catches a job switch originating from firms of increasing 
dimension.  Thus in the North-East corner above the diagonal we have job-switches 
from small to large; in the South-West corner from large to small. 
 
The four tables show the coefficients (all multiplied by 100): 
A.1 = blue collars / manufacturing; A.2= white collars / manufacturing 
A.3 = blue collars / service industries;  A.4 = white collars / service industries 
 
 





Blue collars: 20415 obs. 
 
Tab.  A.1    MANUFACTURING 
               To:               S        M      L          
 From:  
S    0   12++   21++ 
M  - 6 +               (- 10)    4+    6+ 
L  - 22+  - 5          (- 12)  - 3 
   
Tab.  A.2     SERVICES 
-  3 +    10 +   31 ++ 
-  7     0    0 
-  34 +  - 33 +   10 
 
 
White collars: 9752 obs. 
  
Tab.  A.3      MANUFACTURING 
- 12           ( 8 )  12 +   36 +           ( 9 ) 
  0    9 +   13 +            (0 ) 
  25 +  18 ++          ( 3 )     9 +           (- 1 ) 
  
Tab.  A.4     SERVICES 
 0    15 +    58 ++          ( 31) 
 0                ( - 19 )    13 +    16 + 
 29              ( - 60 )     7    11 
 
0 = coefficient non significant; no asterisk  = 90% significance; ( + ) = 95% significance; (++) 99% > significance 
 
1.  The pattern is very clear for the blue-collars (tab. A.1 and A.2): job switches 
from small to large firms (NE corner) have positive coefficients; job-switches in the 
reverse direction (SW corner) have negative coefficients. The greater the difference 
in size between the firm of origin and that of destination, the larger (in absolute 
value) the wage change coefficient. This appears to be a consequence of the strong 
correlation between earnings and firm size, in conjunction with the modest lifetime 
upgrading of wage profiles of blue-collar workers, whether in the manufacturing or 
the service industries. 
The pattern is very different among the white-collars (A.3 and A:4): switches across 
different size firms are always positively signed (with one exception, the S-S 
switches in manufacturing, in A.3), indicating that job changes of the white-collars 
are often associated with promotions to a higher within-contract pay grade.  
Notice, however, as will be discussed hereafter, that the wage losses associated to 
downsizing effects, is much higher for the white-collars than for manual workers. 
The magnitude of wage gains (losses) is often remarkable, especially for the white-
collars: 36 p.p. when the switch takes place between small (S) and large (L) firms in 
manufacturing (A.3); 58 p.p. when the same occurs in the service industries (A.4). 
Somewhat lower, but still substantial are the gains to manual workers for analogous 
  17 moves: 21 and 31 p.p. respectively in manufacturing and service industries. Also job 
switches from L-firms to S-firms turn out profitable for the white-collars: 25 and 29 
p.p. respectively in manufacturing and service industries (A.3 and A.4). On the other 
hand, similar job changes for manual workers carry very substantial wage losses: 22 
and 34 p.p. respectively in manufacturing and services (A.1 and A.2). 
A noticeable wage loss of 33 p.p. is found for manual workers who move from L-
firms to M-firms of the service sector.  
Job switches across firms of similar size (along the diagonal) yield small wage gains 
among blue-collars; somewhat larger among the white-collars. 
 
2.  We now turn to the impact of downsizing on job switches. In Italy the 1986-91 
period was characterised by a slow worsening of general economic prospects, which 
led into the 1990-91 recession. Many firms, especially the large ones, went through 
restructuring and reduced activity, often leading to important downsizing.   
In our exploration a dummy variable DOWN is activated for all the downsized 
workers (i.e. those whose separation takes place when the firms either close down or 
drastically reduce their work-force in the 1986-91 observation window). This is 
aimed at catching an overall, presumably negative impact on wage growth as a 
consequence of downsizing events for both stayers and movers. In addition, for the 
movers the DOWN dummy is interacted with each of the job-change D(i;k,j) 
variables, while DOWN-STAY is associated only to stayers. 
The estimated coefficients denote the wage loss that people suffer, whether  moving 
or staying, attributable to the fact that they were on payroll at downsizing firms.  As 
already explained our hypothesis is that, when DOWN is activated, workers are - as 
it were - forced by the events to either move or stay. The estimates provide some 
support for this hypothesis, but only for workers who undertake job changes. 
Somewhat surprisingly, we find no generalized impact of downsizing on wage 
growth, nor do the estimates indicate any specific impact on the stayers' earnings 
profile. For the movers, the coefficient associated to job change, net of the 
“downsizing effect”, is shown in parenthesis in tab. A.1- A.4. We find support for the 
hypothesis that job switches associated with downsizing are seldom voluntary quits, 
but rather decisions that  pre-empt a layoff perceived as likely to occur within a short 
time. Noticeably, the wage losses suffered as a consequence of downsizing are 
greater and more frequent for the white-collars than for the blue-collars. 
Take, for instance, the A.4 matrix (white-collars; service industries): a switch from S 
to L yields a gain of 58 p.p., but this gets reduced to 31 p.p. if the worker has left a S-
firm that has downsized (or closed).  A switch from an  M-firm to a S-firm yields no 
wage gain; if the M-firm of origin has downsized, the workers involved in the change 
suffer a net loss of 19 p.p.   Notice the huge loss (- 60 p.p.) inflicted to white-collars 
who move following the downsizing of a large  L – firm and ending up in a small  S-




4.3 Unemployment  spells 
 
                                                 
12  Results for Germany are reported in M.C. Burda and A. Mertens (2001): they find that wages of 
displaced workers decline slightly upon reemployment. The lowest earnings quartile (where 
displacement is concentrated) gains slightly (+2%), while wage growth losses for the upper three 
quartiles are comparable to US evidence ( - 17%)  reported by H. Farber (1997). 
 
  18 One’s absence from the panel between two employment spells indicates - with high 
probability - periods spent in unemployment 
13. The length of such spells has a slight, 
but nonetheless significant, impact on total wage growth, independent of age.  The 
reduction of wage growth at the end of the observation period is only 0.1%  for each 
month spent in unemployment for the blue-collars, movers and stayers alike. One 
possible explanation for such a slight impact is that skilled manual workers are 
always in high demand, regardless of the business cycle: many have been forced into 
early retirement by restructuring businesses, but few move into unemployment. For 
the unskilled, instead, there is never any real skill obsolescence due to 
unemployment. A six-month unemployment spell between two successive jobs 
would induce a reduction of wage growth by 0.6 p.p. Not surprisingly, the negative 
impact of  unemployment spells is  higher for the white-collar movers, about - 0.4 
p.p. for each month in unemployment, adding up to - 2.4 p.p. for a six-month 
unemployment spell, and – 4.8 p.p. for a one-year spell. No impact, however, 
emerges for the white-collars who go through unemployment but get rehired in the 
same firm at the end of the spell. 
14 
These results confirm the hypothesis that the careers of those who remain blue 
collars all their life -basically low skilled manual workers- are flat and unaffected by 
spells of unemployment, provided they are back on the job by the end of the 
observation period. On the other hand, and in line with explanations in term of 
specific human capital, a career interrupted by periods spent in unemployment does 
have somewhat of an impact on the earning profiles of the white collars.  
 
Table 18 The impact of intervening unemployment spells on 
wage growth (unemployment duration in months) 
  1 month  6 months 
 Movers  Stayers  Movers  Stayers 
BLUE-COLLARS  - 0.001  -  0.001  - 0.006  - 0.006 
        
WHITE-COLLARS  - 0.004  0  - 0.024  0 
        
 
4.4  Frequency of job changes 
 
Frequent job switching could be a signal of intense search behaviour, and therefore 
associated with higher wage growth. On the other hand, too many job-changes could 
reflect the precariousness of certain positions, characterised by a great deal of 
uncertainty. 
                                                 
13 Unemployment cannot be recorded with certainty in our data-base: self-employment, out-of-the-
labor force including retirement (for those in eligible age), moves in the public sector (following a 
tenured hire), are all compatible with attrition. The observed frequency of moves into self-
employment is a little over 7% of all separations; that of entering the irregular economy, obviously 
unknown, may be high expecially in the South, but mainly for those who have never been regularly 
employed before (which is not the case with a closed panel like ours). Notice a similar observation in 
M.C. Burda and A. Mertens (2001): in Germany only 80% of all displaced workers are found in 
socially insured employment 4 years after displacement.  
 
14 Our estimates are lower than those reported by S. Nickell, P. Jones, G. Quintini (2002) for the U.K. 
Estimated (hourly) earning losses amount to 10-20% during the first year from rehiring after the first 
unemployment spell.  As in Italy, losses tend to  be higher, the higher the skill level of those involved.  
  19 Estimation provides interesting insight also within age groups: among the blue-
collars there is no visible impact at any age. Among the white-collars, instead, a 
certain amount of job-switching has positive effect on wage growth, but only among 
people in age-groups 1 and 2 (i.e. less than 40 yrs. old): two moves do better than 
one; three do better than two; but four (or more) flattens the wage profile back to the 
level of the stayers. Above 40 years of age the positive impact is modest with two 







Table 19 Frequency of job changes: impact on wage growth  
BLUE- 
COLLARS 
2  MOVES  3 MOVES  4 >  MOVES 
age  20 – 30  0  0  0 
age  30 – 40  0  0  0 
age  40 – 50  0  0  0 
ALL  AGES  0  0  0 
WHITE-COLLARS      
age  20 – 30  0.08 *  0.16 *  0 
age  30 – 40                   0.11*                   0.12  0 
age  40 – 50                   0.06   0  0 




4.5 Initial  conditions 
 
Wage growth in the period 1986-91 may be influenced by initial conditions: 
unobservable, individual effects like intellectual endowment, entrepreneurial 
attitudes, risk propensity, and the like. A reasonable proxy is the i-th individual's 
relative wage in 1986 (INEQ86), i.e. the ratio between w(i,86) and the average wage 
1986 of individuals belonging to the same cell (age x industry x skill level). In 




There could be a problem of endogeneity of this proxy: 1986 seldom coincides with 
the beginning of one's working career (safe for very few young workers). Thus, 
endowed individuals may have a higher initial relative wage, and INEQ86 may be 
correlated with the residuals. Estimation via instrumental variables could be an 
appropriate strategy.  
An alternative strategy, which we follow here, consists of estimating two versions of 
the wage growth equation: one including INEQ86 among the regressors, the other 
excluding it. Consider the following outcome: (1) the coefficient estimates are very 
similar in the two versions ; (2) the overall fitness improves only marginally when 
INEQ86 is included among the regressors; (3) the residuals are nearly identical. If 
(1), (2) and (3) are verified together, the implication is that initial conditions do not 
matter, and that simultaneity bias is not much of a problem here. 
 
                                                 
15 Farber and Gibbons (1991), among others, find a strong correlation through time between wages 
and proxies of ability. 
  20 The following table displays the outcome of this exercise: we report here also the 
equations estimated separately for each age group, as initial conditions – not 
surprisingly - appear to be more relevant at young age than later. Recall that a 
negative coefficient for INEQ86 is expected by construction as w(i,86) is the 









Table 20 OLS regressions of wage growth with proxy for initial conditions 
(INEQ86) 
 Mean  #  Coeff.  INEQ  Std.  Err.  R
2 with INEQ R
2 without INEQ 
BLUE  C.   
age 20-30 
1.58 7533 -0.659  0.018  0.227  .068 
WHITE C. 
age 20-30 
1.82 2785 -0.236  0.032  0.144  .102 
BLUE C.  
     age 30-40 
1.53 7000 -0.355  0.016  0.132  .053 
WHITE C.  
age 30-40  
1.73 4018 -0.042  0.02  0.142  .086 
BLUE C.  
age 40-50 
1.51 5882 -0.323  0.016  0.111  .039 
WHITE C.  
age 40-50 
1.65 2949 -0.075  0.019  0.114  .047 
            
BLUE C.  
all ages 
 20415  -0.426  0.009  0.157  0.069 
WHITE C.  
all ages 
 9752 -0.086  0.012  0.144  0.088 
 
Table 21 Correlation between residuals of OLS 
regressions estimated with and without  proxy for 
initial conditions (INEQ86) 
 Correlation  coefficient 
AGE 1 - BLUE C.  0.920 
AGE 2 - BLUE C.   0.961 
AGE 3 - BLUE C.  0.970 
  
ALL AGES – BLUE C.  0.959 
  
AGE 1 - WHITE C.  0.991 
AGE 2 - WHITE C.  0.999 
AGE 3- WHITE C.  0.999 
  
ALL AGES – WHITE C.  0.995 
 
 
-  the INEQ86 coefficient is significant in all the estimated equations, much larger 
(in absolute value) in the blue-collars' equations than in the white-collars'. The wage 
growth of white-collar workers is weakly conditioned by initial pay, while that of the 
blue-collars is strongly conditioned.
16 
                                                 
16 A different, legitimate, interpretation is that INEQ86 fails to catch the "right" individual characteristics of 
people initially hired in white-collar positions; 
 
  21 -  there are interesting differences across age groups: mong young workers (20-30, 
age-group 1) the INEQ86 coefficient is over twice as large as among older workers, 
for both white and blue-collars; 
-  the coefficient estimates are almost identical in the two versions of the white-
collars' equations. Among the blue-collars some differences are found  in the 
coefficients of industry dummies and firm-size. They are, instead, very slight for the 
dummies that catch the effect of inter-firm mobility;   
-  the correlation of residuals with and without INEQ86 are very high in all 
estimated equations: the order of magnitude is 0.92-0.97 in the blue-collars' 
equations, and 0.99 and over in the white-collars'. 
 
All of the above suggest that initial conditions have a negligible impact on the wage 
profiles of the white-collars. They do, instead, have a modest impact on the blue-




If initial conditions reflect individual endowments  (including educational 
attainment), then one might expect them to show up especially among white-collars, 
whose careers have more prospects and variability than those of people confined to 
manual jobs most of their life. This does not appear to be the case in Italy, for 
reasons related to the following institutional features: (1) the jobs that we observe are 
all "regular" working positions, for which social security contributions are paid in 
full by the employers; (2) the vast majority, if not all, of these contracts are subject to 
collective bargaining agreements. The main implication being – for example - that a 
university graduate in chemical engineering with high honours will be hired at the 
same conditions as an individual who has barely made it through college in whatever 
discipline. Their careers will obviously begin to diverge at some point, but a five-
year horizon is probably not long enough to comprise this point.
18 Our story does not 
imply that the initial employment probabilities will be the same for the two 
characters  in Italy as elsewhere, a chemical engineer has better chances than any 
college graduate. But our study is on transitions of people already in employment, 
not on transitions from school to work.
19 
On the contrary, a young man with a recognized vocational training diploma will be 
hired as a qualified blue-collar at a higher pay grade than an unskilled individual. 
Thus, initial conditions do matter for him, and his 1986- relative pay indeed reflects 
them. This is in line with what is known about the career profiles of manual workers 




4.6 Concluding  remarks 
 
                                                 
17 We are unable, for the time being, to detect the influence of initial conditions on those who achieve 
a career advancement (from a blue-collar to a white-collar position) in the five-year period under 
observation. 
18 In the near future we shall be able to replicate estimation on a ten-year observation period (1986-
96), where it is reasonable to expect significant improvements over the results already at hand. 
19 This is not surprising: in Italy economic returns to education are usually found lower than in many 
countries of the industrialized world (Brunello and Miniaci (1999) report estimates between 4.8 and 
5.6%): one explanation may, in fact,  be provided by the nature of collective bargaining institutions. 
 
20 B. Contini (ed.), Labor mobility and wage dynamics in Italy,  Rosenberg-Sellier (2002). 
  22 This study aims at establishing how mobility and job displacement affected 
individual wage growth in the five-year period 1986-91. Here is a summary of our 
main findings: 
 
(i)  the mean initial wage (1986) of the stayers is more than 10 p.p. higher than that 
of the movers (before moving) in all groups; the mean final wage (1991) of the 
stayers is  8.4 p.p. higher than the movers’; 
(ii)  the mean 1991 wage of the stayers is between 7 – 7.5 p.p. higher than that of 
the movers in the group of expanding or constant-employment firms. It is 
marginally higher (between 1.2 and 2.4 p.p.) among the declining firms; 
(iii)  the wage growth  of the movers is slightly higher than the stayers' in all groups 
of firms; movers do better than stayers at young age (20-30), but the difference 
tends to vanish, especially for manual workers as age progresses; 
(iv)  mover-stayer differentials are larger among white-collars than blue-collars, in 
line with the higher variance of earnings of the former; 
(v)  wage growth attributable to inter-firm mobility is driven by the wage - firm size 
positive correlation only for blue-collar workers: job-switches from small to 
large firms yield substantial pay improvements relative to stayers; job switches 
from large to small size often end up in wage cuts. For the white-collars, 
instead, job changes in either direction tend to improve one's position relative 
to stayers; 
(vi)  workers hit by downsizing events earn lower wages than the rest of their peers, 
both ante-displacement (1986) and post-displacement (1991). This supports the 
hypothesis that downsizing hits mainly the least skilled among both manual 
workers and white-collars.  On the other hand, as indicated below (vii and viii), 
we find no evidence of a generalized downsizing effect on wage growth;   
(vii)  the impact of downsizing on wage growth is localized.   Somewhat 
surprisingly, we find no across-the-board impact. In particular, workers who 
are retained at firms that go through restructuring do not incur in significant 
wage losses;  
(viii) wage losses after displacement hit the white-collars, but no clear pattern is 
detectable: some job changes inflict very substantial wage losses (up to 89 p.p. 
for moves from large to small firms of the service industries), some do not.  
Manual workers are less damaged from downsizing than the white-collars; 
(ix)  prolonged unemployment spells have a modest negative impact on the wage 
growth of white-collar employees (up to 2.5 p.p. for a six-month spell), very 
slight  on the blue-collars’.  We find no impact on workers who get rehired by 
the same firm of origin;   
(x)  frequent job-switching has a positive effect on the wage growth of the young 
and adult white-collars. If job changes become too frequent, however, its 
positive impact vanishes.  No impact is found, instead, on the wage growth of 
manual workers; 
(xi)  initial conditions have limited influence on the wage profile of blue-collar 
employees; none on the white-collars'. 
 
 
4.7 Future  developments  
 
This study suggests many areas for improvements. The main ones are: 
-  estimation over a longer observation window. The panel has been updated, in the 
meantime, through 1999; 
-  open panel estimation, and appropriate handling of unobserved heterogeneity; 
-  modelling job moves as endogenous choices. 
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